

contemporary art understood as a postontological realization

by

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plato's parable

imagine mankind as dwelling in an underground cave with a long entrance open to the light across the whole width of the cave; in this they have been from childhood, with necks and legs fettered, so they have to stay where they are: they cannot move their heads round because of the fetters, and they can only look forward, but light comes to them from fire burning behind them higher up at a distance: between the fire and the prisoners is a road above their level, and along it imagine a low wall has been built, as puppet showmen have screens in front of their people over which they work their puppets

i see, he said

see, then, bearers carrying along this wall all sorts of articles which they hold projecting above the wall, statues of men and other living things, made of stone or wood and all kinds of stuff, some of the bearers speaking and some silent, as you might expect

what a remarkable image, he said, and what remarkable prisoners!

just like ourselves, i said: for, first of all, tell me this: what do you think such people would have seen of themselves and each other except their shadows, which the fire cast on the opposite wall of the cave?

i don't see how they could see anything else, said he, if they were compelled to keep their heads unmoving all their lives!

very well, what of the things being carried along? would not this be the same?

of course it would

suppose the prisoners were able to talk together, don't you think that when they named the shadows which they saw passing they would believe they were naming things?

necessarily

then if their prison had an echo from the opposite wall, whenever one of the passing bearers uttered a sound, would they not suppose that the passing shadow must be making the sound?

don't you think so?

indeed i do, he said

if so, said i, such persons would certainly believe that there were no realities except those shadows of handmade things

so it must be, said he

now consider, said i, what their release would be like, and their cure from these fetters and their folly; let us imagine whether it might naturally be something like this: one might be released, and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round, and to walk and look towards the firelight; all this would hurt him, and he would be too much dazzled to see distinctly those things whose shadows he had seen before: what do you think he would say, if someone told him that what he saw before was foolery, but now he saw more rightly, being a bit nearer reality and turned towards what was a little more real? what if he were shown each of the passing things, and compelled by questions to answer what each one was? don't you think he would be puzzled, and believe what he saw before was more true than what was shown to him now?

far more, he said

then suppose he were compelled to look towards the real light, it would hurt his eyes, and he would escape by turning them away to the things which he was able to look at, and these he would believe to be clearer than what was being shown to him

just so, he said

suppose, now, said I, that someone should drag him thence by force, up the rough ascent, the steep way up, and never stop until he could drag him out into the light of the sun, would he not be distressed and furious at being dragged; and when he came into the light, the brilliance would fill his eyes and he would not be able to see even one of the things now called real?

that he would not, said he, all of a sudden

he would have to get used to it, surely, i think, if he is to see the things above: first he would most easily look at shadows, after the images of mankind and the rest in water, lastly seeing the things themselves: after this he would find it easier to survey by night the heavens themselves and all that is in them, gazing at the light of the stars and moon, rather than by day the sun and the sun's light

of course

last of all, i suppose, the sun; he could look on the sun itself by itself in its own place, and see what it is like, not reflections of it in the water or as it appears in some alien setting necessarily, said he

the ontological course has advanced according to plato's parable backwards, from the reality of the sun, through the tunnel of time, until reaching pure illusion: these stages are the preontological age, the ontological age and the postontological age

seeing the same everyone would see the same but looking at what has been seen already one sees what was not seen before

1 preontology

1,1 preontology is apprehension of World

1,2 beings are inside Being and Being is inside World: World is life

1,3 preontological realization manifests eternity: preontological realization manifests World through Being through beings: yet these beings share in common not that they are beings but that they are force and are subject to force: World is apprehended as force

1,4 preontology divides World into two: life and the-making-of-life: this division is the beginning of being-in-World (technology is not the beginning for as itself it only refers being-in-World back to life and not to the-making-of-life): the-making-of-life is inside life, yet it reflects life in its entirety

1,5 World reveals to all its beings and World is revealed by all its beings: preontological realization is manifestation of totality

2 cosmology: because of my brother, i am afraid of death

2,1 cosmology is the transitional period between the ages of preontology and ontology

2,2 cosmology is the manifestation of world: world is the accumulation and distinction of beings between each other so as to be arranged within World: world is a specific mode or division of Being by which being is immerse in World: world is the time and space required for a being to recognize itself as such by means of its possibilities and decisions

2,3 cosmology manifests being-in-human as a world within World: being-in-human is one of the worlds in which World reveals itself: but being-in-human is also the world to whom –as that specific world– World is revealed as the realm of all worlds: cosmology is the eternalization of being-in-human, exact reflection of his relation to eternal World: cosmological realization as much distinguishes being-in-human from other beings-in-themselves as he establishes being-in-human as indistinguishable within himself: being-in-human aspires to eternity as he is gradually grasped by time (as in the case of gilgamesh): cosmological realization is the manifestation of generality

2,4 cosmology describes|defines the eternity of World by the emergence, rotation, movement and realization (the-making-of-life) of time: cosmology is the division of World by way of opposites: the established opposites of World become the opposites of being

2,5 cosmology breaks up into two: ontology and nonontology: ontology is opposite to nonontology: nonontology departs from transitional nonpreontology through non-ontology until it reaches transitional nonpostontology: ontology departs from transitional preontology (cosmology) through ontology until it reaches transitional postontology: ontology is divided into three periods: the philosophical period, the theological period and the scientific period: the philosophical|scientific periods emerge from the cosmological quest for force-in-being (as in

gilgamesh), the theological period emerges from the cosmological quest for being-in-force (as in the *books of the dead*)

3 ontology

3,0,1 ontology is the manifestation of being

3,0,2 ontology is the manifestation of being through Being through World: ontological realization is the manifestation of particularity

3,0,3 ontology is the manifestation of time

3,0,4 ontology is the division of being into opposites: ontology is the identification of humanbeing as humanbeing by way of the possibilities and decisions that take him from his beginning to his end

3,0,5 ontology is the aspiration of permanent and eternal World inasmuch as humanbeing is no longer a part of World: ontology is not being-in-World but being-connected-to-World, being confronted|linked to World: beingWorld

3,1 the philosophical period: know thyself

3,1,1 philosophical period is composed of presentation and examination: art presents humanbeing, philosophy|science examines humanbeing; art presents-life as opposed to philosophy that examines-life; integration-that-desintegrates|disintegration-that-integrates: the first presenter is homer, the first examiner is hesiod

3,1,2 philosophy is the examination of element=being, science is the examination of structure=World: the philosophical period constitutes the emergence of being from World, therefore science is also philosophical inasmuch as it is the aspiration of humanbeing towards World: what philosophical philosophy manifests is equal and simultaneous to what philosophical science manifests: the philosophic quest for the reality of being and the distinction of beings through the victory of permanence over change, is identical to the scientific quest of the same notions, through geometry and astronomy for example, defined as eternal entities which humanbeing, through time, has now set himself to establish eternally: the confrontation|link (that is, the connection) between element and structure reflects the connection between being and World in such a way that all connection establishes a horizontal balance among the two opposites: the ontological age establishes the supreme connection between Being>one|all being and none|no being<Nothing as expression of all connections: life|death, harmony|chaos, truth|falsity, reality|illusion, soul|body (two realms connected through the bridge of 'mind' or 'reason', as all other opposite notions are also connected through the force between themselves and each other), permanence|change, good|bad, virtue|vice, wisdom|ignorance, destiny|ruin, beauty|horror, peace|war, tragedy|comedy, male|female, etcetera: the impulse to one or the other is an 'ontological' or 'antiontological' realization respectively: ontological realization establishes the law of power|oppression, antiontological realization establishes the exception of ridicule|absurdity: ontological or antiontological realization is a tragedy if the force that connects

directs higher up through fury towards confrontation, a comedy if the force than connects directs lower down through patience towards unity: the identification of humanbeing, that is, his possibilities and decisions, wherever it is they came from or are going to, is a decidable challenge that rests as entirely up to humanbeing

3,1,3 ontology establishes lineal time (past|present|future expressed by lineage) and oriented space (expressed by origin and death place, the emplacement of limits, as well as establishing cardinal points from which to guide humanbeing connected to World and not let World guide these points) as the force that connects beginning to end through a climactic point of manifestation: the simplest or particular manifestation is poetic (that which aspires to insert the-making-of-life into life, by which humanbeing enters and acknowledges life), the intermediate or general manifestation is dramatic (that which aspires to recognize life in the-making-of-life and vice versa, by which the-making-of-life of humanbeing stands equal to life), the most complex or total manifestation is epic (that which aspires to insert life into the-making-of life, by which humanbeing's realization is itself life): poetry, drama and epic are not only artistic manifestations but also philosophical|scientific manifestations as proved by the presocratic philosophers, plato and aristotle

3,1,4 exactly as world emerged from World in cosmology, being emerges from world in the philosophical period: humanbeing emerges from society: the heroes emerge from the cities, the dramatic hero emerges from the chorus, the melody emerges from the harmony: no character ever speaks alone, not in homer and not in the dramatic plays: either a humanbeing talks to another, or the gods or the chorus is listening: hero and chorus are placed side by side: victory for society cannot be achieved until philoctetes, the individual, is brought back: these two inseparable notions eventually break in euripides' *medea* as in plato's *apology* because the complete manifestation of the individual necessarily means his priority over the manifestation of world: art and philosophy after that climactic break try to describe|define the manner in which being emerges from world by which both can again constitute a reflection of each other: humanbeing is never presented or examined detached from society, to such an extent that plato's examination of humanbeing is preceded by the examination of society, for society defines the individual as such first, only in relation to society can the individual recognize himself as such, then should an individual correspond to society by identifying his role in society as well as by acknowledging his and every individual's connection to the whole of society

3,1,5 yet the emergence of the individual and his aspiration to identify himself as himself requires a specific ontological posture in which to conceive that identification (that is, a powerful identification requires first a presentation of all notions –as achieved by homer–, then a rupture of these notions by which humanbeing can manifest each notion separately so that, when summed up, humanbeing can manifest all notions as a gradual exploration of himself): in the presocratic philosophers, in parmenides, in aeschylus, and in socrates, humanbeing is defined by thought; in sophocles as in plato, humanbeing is defined by will; in euripides, diogenes the cynic and in aristotle, humanbeing is defined by his actions: these ontological postures concerning the individual are never presented|examined disregarding their social connection: yet opposite notions (by which beings, through thought, are revealed as themselves and by which Being and World are also revealed) eventually break apart due to the fact that the complete and most powerful manifestation of one notion cancels out its opposite notion: World is entirely tragic in

one realization, entirely comic in another: only after detachment from the opposition can one notion reveal its absolute presence, and therefore humanbeing's identification with himself, pursuing to achieve it with his mightiest strength, is broken entirely apart, as a balloon does when inflated too much: the failure of thought is expressed by Socrates' 'i know nothing': sophocles' and plato's goal is not to be able to distinguish good from bad, truth from falsity, but to pursue the notion humanbeing finds best, to detach humanbeing from contemplation and to set him into motion towards the achievement of what he thinks and is set to act: this purpose can be sought after by human being as much as it can mercilessly snatch him towards some other unknown purpose, as happens to oedipus: sophocles and plato end up coinciding that the stronger the will, the harder it is to return to thought as well as to achieve what it desires, eventually constituting the explosion and failure of will (as is the case in plato's *parmenides*, the supreme achievement of the philosophical period): aristotle –that emotionless monster, the most perfect puppet hanging from the postontological strings by which humanbeing was deceived into believing he could identify as humanbeing– proposes action as the fundamental standpoint from which thought and will depend on: his prudent middle ground is free of excessive contraries; for him there is no unachievable beyondness towards which humanbeing thrusts himself: with the circumstances given one must do as best one can; standing before an infinite number of possibilities the essential thing is to make a choice (that is, possibilities are not surpassed by one decision or another but by the action of deciding in itself): one after another, a unified chain of choices will overcome the possibilities from which they emerged, or at least they will establish the decisive realm of possibilities which one can decide upon on the condition that they correspond to humanbeing inseparably related to his society, exact reflection of the force that connects being before World: yet this viewpoint, remarkable in that however many answers it tries to give it does not let go of doubt, ends up draining all beings of the force with which they identify themselves as such (as can be proved by the heirs of aristotle who, though concerned exclusively for action, entirely cancelled out possibility, thereby canceling out their own choices): aristotle not only views his ontological moment but views this moment as immerse in an ontological course extending across the entire philosophical period, yet in viewing this not as a competition for reality but a history of this competition, the philosophical period is immediately ended

3,2 the theological period

3,2,0,1 whereas in the philosophical period the force (however limitless this force may be) that identifies humanbeing as such is within humanbeing (force generates and exhausts within humanbeing), in the theological period beinghuman is within force (beinghuman generates and exhausts within force): beinghuman is the instrument and recipient by which force identifies itself as force: force is g-d, that by which beinghuman's possibilities and decisions are entirely possible: whereas philosophical humanbeing aspires to identify itself within, through and beyond the force that compels this identification, theological force aspires to identify itself within, through and beyond beinghuman

3,2,0,2 theology divides into three periods: the transitional preontological period, the ontological period and the transitional postontological period: only the theological ontological period coincides with –and continues– the philosophical ontological period

3,2,0,3 theology is the unification of art and philosophy|science: theology is a presentation=examination

3,2,1 the transitional preontological theological period: i am who i am

3,2,1,1 force-that-is-g-d is manifestation of beinghuman, yet in the transitional preontological theology beinghuman does not identify with this force: force is within, across and beyond beinghuman: force is theologically individualized as being-identified-with-himself is philosophically individualized: as in the philosophical period, force is the emergence of being from World inasmuch as this emerged being entirely reflects, constitutes, and holds World: the ontological aspiration of this force demands that beinghuman identify himself as such, as the only being in which this force can be revealed and corresponded, as exemplified by the breath of g-d into beinghuman by which they are both reflected in the same identification: yet the preontological aspect of force is so strong that it is capable of destroying beinghuman (as well as all other beings) in order to manifest itself as absolute force: g-d is the force revealed within and as itself: force precedes, underlies and exceeds beings and their identification as such because it is the undisclosed force by which all beings are displayed: this force exposes beings so as to reveal itself supremely not only as the force between them and as the force within them but as the force beyond them

3,2,1,2 force-that-is-g-d establishes lineal time and oriented space (expressed by lineage and origin of biblical characters) by which his force is progressively revealed: past, present and future are manifest in the alliances g-d makes with noah, david and abraham respectively, exactly as the *pentateuch* and the historical books manifest the past, the wisdom books manifest the present, and the prophetic books manifest the future: force-that-is-g-d establishes the ontological division of opposites from the very first tales of *genesis*: *genesis* is to theology what homer is to the philosophical period: in its powerful account of events it manifests indistinct thought, will and action, yet the ontological division of opposites is gradually established from the beginning of *genesis*, as in adam and eve's first sin of creating life by love-making (for until that point only g-d creates) and beinghuman's second sin of destroying life because of hatred, as expressed by cain (for until that point only g-d destroys): this division of opposites and its equal balance is sought after from *genesis*, passing through mooses' laws, to christ: destiny|ruin, soul|body, man|woman, life|death, love|hatred, wisdom|ignorance, good|evil, truth|lie, justice|piety, being|nothing, etcetera: these notions are not attributed to beinghuman (achieved through his own force) but are attributed to g-d (achieved through his own beinghumans): yet g-d-as-force is not constituted by opposites but is the force by which all opposites come to happen: through the strict appliance of g-d's laws (that are both the pursuit of ontological identification as they are an unbreakable manifestation of force), beinghuman is as much coming closer to g-d as beinghuman is earning expulsion and punishment from g-d: yet it is not humanbeing who is approaching g-d through the fulfillment of these laws and exceptions: it is g-d who, understanding ever better the balanced connection between his laws and exceptions is approaching ever closer to beinghuman: even though eternity is broken, g-d gradually aspires to the completion of time (the force that takes time from its beginning to its end) parallel to beinghuman constantly breaking time even further in the pursuit of g-d and his revelation in beinghuman's time: the completion of time corresponds to the number 1000, but since beinghuman is expelled from eden this age is progressively unattainable (adam lives 930 years while mooses lives to be 120 years old): the

completion of space designates the promised land, though as soon as it is –partially– conquered this realm starts to fall to the hands of its enemies: the gradual revelation of beinghuman-in-g-d gives way to the gradual revelation of g-d-in-beinghuman: whereas lamech will be avenged seventy-sevenfold, and cain sevenfold, the force-for-force which the law of *leviticus* establishes as a perfect and equal balance (no matter what possibilities and decisions originated and distinguishes one force from the other) is eventually transformed by isaac's unfulfilled sacrifice into the absolute essentiality of beinghuman's life, for every aspect of beinghuman is a step towards the ontological revelation of g-d (therefore satan can hurt job in any way he wants but not kill him, for job's apprehension of his own possibilities and decisions reveal ontological g-d within, through and beyond job): g-d and beinghuman persevere one in the other

3,2,1,3 just as the emergence of individual humanbeing from his society is emphasized during the philosophical period, by which both notions were divergent as they were inseparable, the individual g-d is distinct yet linked to beinghuman's society (g-d gives his laws to society in the exact moment in which beinghumans all gather together under the sinai mountain floating over them: g-d reflects himself in society): yet the individual beinghuman progressively emerges from society in the figure of lot, job or jonah: force-that-is-g-d identifies himself as force in, across and beyond all beings, yet the ontological aspiration of theology is to make this identification pierce right through the identification of beinghuman as himself

3,2,1,4 the identification of beinghuman (within the force-that-is-g-d) can only be revealed, as in the philosophical period, in life: death is irreconcilable to life, death is the realm in which no possibilities or decisions can occur: as long as life is conceived lineally, death is the final point which ends life, after which no identification is possible: even though life is confronted as much as it is linked to death, even though their connection establishes them as opposites notions, the transitional preontological theological period, in the exact same manner as the philosophical period, establishes beinghumans' unique position within life, not death: death is the possibility that may lead beinghuman from being to nothing, among other possibilities, yet possibility itself may only be manifested in life for there are no possibilities in death: the only possibility death manifests to the living is the lack of possibility and the lack of life: even so, the possibility of identification can reveal itself only inasmuch as it is confronted to the possibility of lack of identification, and so, beyond their being exact opposites of each other, the entire realm of identification is always subject to doubt

3,2,1,5 the parallels between the philosophical period and the transitional preontological theological period are numerous beyond their simultaneous realization from the year -1000 to 0: the horse talks to achilles as the female donkey speaks to balaam; athena interrupts time for odysseus and penelope as yhwh draws time back as a sign from isaiah to hezekiah; ganymede is snatched by the gods to heaven as enoch and elijah are also carried away by g-d to heaven; the entire description of the armies and the count of their ships is as essential as the census and the measures of the ark (inasmuch as they manifest the connection between the one and the all by which beinghuman and World are, through measures, accessible to knowledge in respect to each other): the *old testament* also brings forth poetry, drama and epic through the perspective of the first, second or third person as in, for example, the *psalms*, *job* or *chronicles*: yet the philosophical period and transitional preontological theological period are incompatible for they have opposite postures concerning the relationship individual|society (force in being) and

society|individual (being in force), though both stand in life (as contrary to death): hesiod, an individual humanbeing, narrates the creation of the society of gods (man is the measure of all things); individual g-d revealed to a society of humanbeings, narrates through the anonymous composition of *genesis* the creation of beinghuman (g-d is the measure of all things)

3,2,2 the theological period: i shall know as i am known

3,2,2,0,1 theology becomes completely ontological at the point in which the identification of g-d as force pierces through the force with which beinghuman identifies himself as himself, one reflected exactly in the other: the supreme manifestation of this unity is g-d's incarnation: g-d becomes a beinghuman: just as philosophically humanbeing is divided into the two realms of soul and body connected through the bridge of mind, g-d achieves an entirely human form as soul (the g-d of the *pentateuch* from which it all began), body (the figure of christ to which the prophets lead) and mind (the holy ghost manifestation of wisdom revealed at the middle of the *old testament*) as the bridge that bonds these two opposite notions together: g-d as an absolute beinghuman is revealed in christ's new commandment: to love one another is not the aspiration to g-d-as-force but the acknowledgment of this force by which beinghumans can identify themselves as such: g-d is not an aim beyond beinghuman but only in the relationship of beinghumans can g-d reveal himself: the appeal towards the social identity is proportional to the pursuit towards g-d's individual identity, to the point that the climactic manifestation of the individual is not in beinghuman (whereas philosophical humanbeing in the pursuance of himself is gradually detached from the social and gods by finding himself and, only then, the social and gods within and beyond him as an individual): yet the theological period, though it seems similar to a nonontological manifestation, is not nonontology: it is the broadest ontological identification of beinghuman inasmuch as the annulled individual is identified as himself within the identification of g-d who is not the opposite of the social but the force than connects society, the individual and g-d together): whereas the philosophical period perfectly distinguished as different realms the emerging being from World (even though confronted|linked to each other) by which the revelation of being –first– constituted the revelation of World –second–, the theological period aspires to identify beinghuman as World, as equal one to the other, as the manifestation of World within beinghuman inasmuch as beinghuman is manifested within World, as the revelation of World –first– therefore the revelation of being –second–: the theological period, therefore, is ontological inasmuch as even though the individual is annulled proportionally to the manifestation of g-d, g-d in his entirety is conceived as beinghuman in the most broad and ideal identification possible: rather than trying to disclose beinghuman's force that elevates him towards the force-that-is-g-d as the manifestation of both one in the other (as in moses, who because of that arrogance is prohibited to enter the promised land), the theological period manifests g-d inasmuch as beinghuman achieves absolute lack of one's own self-directed force as an individual by deflating this force and directing it towards others so as to annul force entirely, substituting the individual identification by the social identification (thereby expressing g-d's force and identification in all three realms –social, individual and g-d– within himself, manifest in the annulled individual that, by absencing himself, expresses g-d's individuality and presence in and as World): absolute forgiveness, the first of christ's revelations, is not the reestablishment of a previous order, as vindictive justice aspires to, but the acknowledgment of time's uninterrupted continuity by which it is impossible to return to the past: forgiveness determines the present as it is determined by it

3,2,2,0,2 theological ontology achieves the complete distinction of opposites: g-d is the good (the good that rewards and forgives as well as the good that punishes and condemns): the force opposite to g-d (apparently not in might but in intention, though one notion never surpasses its opposite entirely) is that of satan: the afterlife is also shared with the devil by means of heaven and hell (though g-d is the force that manifests and rules over heaven and hell connected through earth): opposite notions are not only sliced in half and shared with the devil but occur in christ himself: christ-beinghuman is emphasized by the gospels of matthew and mark, while christ-g-d is emphasized by the gospels of luke and john: these four realizations in relation to each other reveal christ as both an individual g-d as well as an individual beinghuman by way of the passion: christ is alone in the cross as an individual identified with himself by which he identifies as beinghuman not as being-in-World nor being-in-world but as being-that-is-World: the progressive identification of beinghuman in regards to all beinghumans is brought to its theological climax in christ: this emergence from society that asserts being is expressed in christ's claim that the revelation of beinghuman depends upon one's own actions

3,2,2,0,3 yet the climactic theological manifestation of the individual as opposed to the world from which it emerged, constitutes the same irreconcilable rupture and election of being over world that socrates' death proved (even though the philosophical election reveals being-as-reflection-of-World, that is, being whose destiny –or ruin– is to manifest World, whereas the theological election reveals World-as-reflection-of-being, being-that-is-World, World inasmuch as it is the force-that-is-g-d whose destiny –or ruin– is to manifest being: one manifests humanbeing within, the other manifests beinghuman beyond, yet both positions are ontological inasmuch as it is being confronted|linked to World that is the question, rather than preontological World that ignores being or the postontological World that destroys being: the theological World pulls the destruction of a fig tree towards beinghuman's identification, for example, rather than, as in nonontology, pushes nonbeinghuman's nonidentification towards a nonfig tree: either life is proved to be ontologically and entirely human, or nonhuman is proved to be nonontologically and entirely life, for the nonontological annulment does not seek to find a further human form embracing World as the ontological theological annulment): however related society and the individual are connected to the force-that-is-g-d between them and beyond them, society and the individual break entirely apart due to christ's crucifixion, thereby achieving the manifestation of g-d in and beyond the essential identification of individual being: rather than disavow society, future theologians will try to reunite society and individual again through the force that is g-d

3,2,2,0,4 ontological theology breaks away from transitional preontological theology and becomes the continuation of ontological philosophy by way of the revelation not of life but of death: death is an afterlife: whereas both the philosophical period and the transitional preontological theological period concede absolute priority to this life and not to death itself (even though they do distinguish and bond one to the other), the ontological theologians establish absolute priority to the afterlife and not to this life: resurrection is the essential fact by which exhausted ontological philosophy advances towards the generating ontological theology: beinghuman identifies himself as such in the afterlife, not in this life: the afterlife is a state of identification with oneself as what one is among all identifications: heaven is absolute and eternal peace for it is permanence that has finally conquered change, for which blessed body and soul no longer participate in change –one does not eat, have sex or sleep in the afterlife– beinghuman only participates in permanent goodness, as opposed to hell, in which the damned

suffer absolute and eternal torments, hell that is precisely a manifestation of change due to which soul and body suffer in and through change understood as evil: g-d manifests himself as force advancing in between creation and destruction fulfilled in time and space created and destroyed by and for g-d in relation to himself so as to place all beings in their exact ontological position and thereby achieve World brought back from eternity

3,2,2,0,5 just as three ontological standpoints are established throughout the philosophical period, they are also established in the theological period as the individual emerges from *genesis* to christ: g-d not only creates World but resolves it is all good, that is, g-d thinks: thought is manifested as apprehension of the divine from adam to the twelve tribes: mooses' laws to king david, though they keep exploring opposite notions through thought, direct themselves towards the fulfillment of thought through will: beinghuman is defined by thought-directed-to-will, which is the stage in which the identification of g-d and beinghuman keep steadily achieving a divine promise, until the construction of the first temple: after the loss of the other ten tribes, up to the forthcoming captivity and exile, beinghuman is then defined by will-directed-to-action from isaiah to zachariah, which is the stage in which the divine purpose, now unknown, appears to be steadily unfulfilled and unfulfilling: christ understands beinghuman by way of actions, he urges beinghumans to act out goodness, parables are account of actions, and the passion is itself not a rational discourse nor an unfulfilled desire but an action taken to its completion

3,2,3 the transitional postontological theological period: be!

3,2,3,1 transitional postontological theological period is gradually unconcerned for the identification of beinghuman, its insignificance expressed by the acceptance of beinghuman's death so as to manifest g-d-that-is-again-force regardless of any ontological identity as beinghuman: this absolute force can only be re-achieved by the annulation of opposites: each notion is now irreconcilable to its opposite: beinghuman no longer contains opposite notions within him inasmuch as he identifies himself as such: the most important annulation of opposites concerns the connection between possibilities and decisions, as either destiny (obedience) or ruin (confusion) are established by g-d from the beginning, and the connection between life and death is also annulled for they are indistinguishable: even though postontological theology also establishes an afterlife (and this is its most important and irreconcilable difference concerning preontological theology), this afterlife is a blessed or a cursed life that beinghuman never ceases to live: it does not manifest the permanent victory of one notion over another concerning the permanent ontological identification of beinghuman: the afterlife can only be conceived through change, whether in satisfaction or suffering, inasmuch as body and soul are indistinguishable (the pleasure or pain of the soul constitutes the same pleasure or pain of the body)

3,2,3,2 as the two theological periods it continues, transitional postontological theology starts by establishing law and order first, establishing towards the end the apocalyptic irruption of chaos: yet time and space within this postontological framework is ever more puzzling: ambiguous, uncountable, repetitive, non-narrative, and instantaneous: if the first theological period is an apprehension of time, if the second theological period is a manifestation of time, the transitional postontological theological period barley recognizes time within its general anachronism: it repudiates time by retaking rhyme as its principal condition, it projects time as an illusion by way of time jumps in each sura itself as in the final arrangement of the suras in the *quran* (as in

the one thousand and one nights), it lineally traces time up to the revelation of postontological disoriented instantaneity: just as transitional preontological theology detaches itself from eternity thereby gradually revealing time and space as a lineal process (yet it still keeps expecting time and space to complete themselves, as expressed by *exodus*), exactly as ontological theology manifests the completion of time and space (for christ fulfills all promises ever made by g-d and will fulfill them again), postontological theology is symbolized by the first emigration of the prophet and by ceaseless movement around the kaaba, that is, postontological theology constitutes the gradual disacknowledge of time and space for g-d is ever more beyond them: yet that doesn't place g-d in eternity but in the instant, a moment more and more concentrated upon itself: g-d is one step ahead of time and space for he is increasingly revealed at every single instant of time and space, to such an extent that the instant, to express its supreme power, detaches itself from the completion of a lineally traced time and space: for postontological theology, time and space are the illusion by which g-d-that-is-force is manifested (illusion is the aspiration by which joseph's tale is 'the most beautiful of all tales', by which the young men slept for 309 years at the bottom of a cave –which is also plato's bottom of the cave–, by which the *quran* describes World in being inhabited by beinghumans, animals, plants, geniuses, demons and angels): whereas the previous theological periods believe in the reality of this life and no other life, or in the illusion of this life and the reality of the afterlife, postontological theology establishes both this life and the afterlife as illusion

3,2,3,3 *bible* means 'lecture', that is, an apprehension and manifestation of g-d: *quran* means 'recitation', that is, a projection towards g-d: beinghuman proceeds from earth, sperm and blood, elements which do not distinguish opposites in them: force is generated and exhausted in and beyond those elements: g-d cannot be a trinity for the number three manifests generation, climactic manifestation and exhaustion of an ontological identification: g-d is not a beinghuman and g-d is not the force with which beinghuman identifies himself as such: g-d is one and g-d is force that does not generate or exhaust itself but only manifests itself by itself, g-d is the force that manifests itself in, through and beyond force, it is the force that grants every force its force (this force is expressed in the enigmatic words at the beginning of some suras by which the force-of-breath takes precedence over any particular being these words could refer to): g-d is the force that sustains a mosquito, the force that pushes the stars or the force that accumulates more and more force by conquering the force with which it is resisted by the unfaithful: nobody is equally indispensable by their common ontological identification in which force and weakness correspond to all beinghumans (that is the difference between postontological force and the ontological force to whom all beinghumans are essential as expressed by job, whereas postontological force is similar to the preontological force with which g-d-that-is-force kills those who oppose his force): postontological g-d is extreme force, never weakness, and beinghuman who perceives g-d adopts force as his own (for g-d reveals in the force of the pious and not in the weakness of the pitied): this force, inasmuch as it no longer corresponds to any identification, transforms beings an World into illusion: as opposed to transitional preontological theology, in which extemporal World precedes being and is directed towards the manifestation of being, transitional postontological theology manifests being before it manifests World: g-d creates by enforcing beings to 'be!': the immense quantity of beings (from bugs to stars) mentioned in the *quran* and g-d's relationship to each being submitted to this force express, by the totality of all beings, that a World is being forged: the postontological theology is World in being

3,2,3,4 force-that-is-g-d intercedes not for all beinghumans, much less for those beinghumans that identify themselves as such: he only cares for those who obey, fear and praise his strength: whereas transitional preontological theological g-d reveals to a world, that is, to a specific society, and whereas ontological g-d reveals to the individual as such, that is, to those who identify themselves as beinghumans, transitional postontological theological g-d reveals to all beings on the exclusive condition that this force is perceived as not subject to any world or being, that is, it reveals to beings-within-force that acknowledge their expendable nature: force is instantaneous as it is inevitable: instantaneous because it has detached itself from time and the theological course that represents this time inasmuch as the quest for permanence has now become impossible and unrealizable: inevitable, because the theological course that lead to this rupture was implicitly established from the very beginning of this course: therefore, postontological theology does not cease to quote, once and again, the theological course of beinghuman (establishing this course from the *torah*, passing through *scripture*, until reaching the *quran*, for only within this course can transitional postontological g-d manifest itself) as much as it perceives of itself as the inevitable culmination of this course as the previous theological periods perceived themselves, yet the force with which this self-assertion is proclaimed makes this very same theological course from which it emerged totally dispensable (for g-d accepts the death of the unfaithful, including transitional preontological theologians and ontological theologians, as opposed to the ontological g-d who necessarily needs the previous theological period to be preserved intact to manifest himself as a fulfilled promise): the postontological theological period, inasmuch as it places g-d outside of time in the instant (transitional postontological g-d has always revealed itself in instant and not in time, whereby time is just an artificial imposition over g-d, according to postontological theology), rather than perceiving itself as the completion of a theological course, is revealed as the disacknowledge of such a course, as that force that is to the utmost beyond any course (even its own transitional postontological course), a force which originated from nowhere and is directed nowhere but towards the manifestation of force itself

3,2,3,5 the transitional postontological theology is the uncontainable irradiation of force: g-d is so much force that it is not g-d who reveals himself to mohamed but the voice of an angel who reveals g-d to him: this voice is at all times ambiguous and delusional for it pertains sometimes to g-d, sometimes to an angel, sometimes to a lot of angels, and sometimes to mohamed himself: gabriel barely names himself and refers to himself as a plurality inasmuch as they always employ the 'we' (he does not identify himself as a unique and unrepeatabe individual but as a multitude of dissolved voices expressing force): the inconsistencies of mohamed teachings is a manifestation of the force of fakeness over the weakness of truth: the brevity which the *quran* gradually heads towards is a manifestation of the instant as expressed by infinite fragmentation: the lunar calendar as preference for night (just as the preontological theological course originates from complete darkness) is a manifestation of self-contained light, just as the night passage in which mohamed is transported by air to jerusalem is the expectancy of the age of wind, that is, the postontological age prophesized by the manbird of lascaux, called cloudcuckooland by aristophanes: its constant reinterpretation of the past originates the feeling that this past was not based on real events but is entirely fiction, that is, illusion (in absolute fiction, past, present and future are undistinguishable): this revelation of all abiding fiction discloses the essential impulse to misunderstand and disacknowledge (the faith required to accept that 19 angels are guarding hell constitutes the acceptance of force revealed by the refusal to understand anything): yet

transitional postontological theology is prelude to the postontological age for it keeps manifesting ontological possibilities and decisions that, even though they lead to the postontological age, drag along an ontological significance inasmuch as g-d can still recognize the faithful: force has not yet turned against itself: the postontological age inaugurates a new spirituality

3,2,2 the theological period (continuation)

3,2,2,1 the philosophical period gives way to its antiphilosophical counterpart, parallel to the moment in which the ontological theology period breaks and continues the transitional preontological theology: whereas in the philosophical period the possibility (or impossibility) and decision of all opposite notions is explored by individual humanbeing trying to establish a definitive weight to the ontological balance (such as good, truth, beauty, piety, wisdom, honor, happiness), the antiphilosophical side of the period explores the possibility (or impossibility) and decision of all antiontological notions (such as evil, grotesque, lie, cruelty, treason, dishonor, misery, passions and the priority of society over individuals) inasmuch as they are also notions that manifest humanbeing: yet the ontological theology is established as the heir of the philosophical period because of its manifestation of the individual as well as its introduction and portrayal of the afterlife as the exact counterweight of the philosophical quest for life: the 'hero' (he who lives life) of the philosophical period becomes the 'saint' (he who lives the afterlife) in the theological period: in the theological period life and death are inverted and it is this life that is the black and ghostly grave that both the philosophic period and the transitional preontological period attributed to death: the actions of christ, because of their metaphorical significance, inevitably lead to the apparition of thought as the essential standpoint from which to view this new ontological period: saint paul is the first who conceives g-d by way of thought: this rational understanding of g-d thrusts the first theologians to discussions concerning the trinity, the eucharist, faith, the afterlife and all other notions by which g-d is manifested as beinghuman: the hermit constitutes the individual beinghuman trying to recognize himself in g-d following the example of christ: yet it is not beinghuman that has become g-d in this equivalent and correspondent identification, it is g-d that became beinghuman once and is now invisible again: beinghuman gradually sets his eyes from christ to g-d: beinghuman gradually starts to leave his ontological identification in the hands of g-d, for it is him who is the most perfect and supreme manifestation of a beinghuman: the second coming expected to arrive by saint paul and the other apostles in the year 100 did not occur

3,2,2,2 saint augustine takes a second ontological posture towards g-d, that of revealing g-d through will: good and evil only take place in time (inasmuch as good and evil are generated and exhausted in beinghuman that generates and exhausts himself in time and space): force-that-is-g-d does not belong to time, he rather manifests his eternity within time, across time and beyond time: whereas the eternity of the cosmological period is extemporal and therefore advances nowhere, the theological manifestation of eternity is revealed not from the outside but within an enclosed framework in which time develops sequentially from a beginning towards an end: the possibilities and decisions concerning beinghumans' identification are gradually understood as only g-d's possibilities and decisions: saint benedict, after the year 500, rejects the hermit who thinks g-d and establishes his monastic order, understood as the expectancy of g-d, that is, the serene will that awaits the manifestation of g-d, no longer through the rational identification of

the individual beinghuman but through his annulment in a community of individuals devoted to the fulfillment of the second coming: the realizations of beinghuman are progressively anonymous: the difference between presentation and examination that until that point had philosophically persevered collapses under gregory's reintroduction of theological symbolism: the unity of g-d, as well as his divine will (his broadening revelation through time and not through static reason) over societies gradually unifying into one is perfectly expressed in gregorian chants in which there is only one melody sung by a community integrated as one individual (in which all distinct individualities are annulled): monophonic music employs not minor and major scales but musical modes that express radiating being-that-is-World that, when added to the length and rigorousness of the music, produce a hypnotic effect, as if it were floating: the theological period's painting distorts its figures as expression of force-that-is-g-d abiding over and within them, that is, rather than painting a beautiful, a realistic or a horrible balloon as expression of the balloon itself and the force which inflates it, supreme force that is air beyond any and all balloons is best manifested when the balloons start to deflate by the pressure of this force: these strange looking figures lack a common proportion and horizontal ground (as in preontological painting); the vertical structure of the represented World manifests the hierarchical connection between beings and, through prayer and response, the World-that-is-being itself; the golden background and oneiric faces manifest the limitless, uncontainable and undeniable revelation of g-d-that-is-beinghuman decreasingly within and increasingly beyond beinghumans: beowulf is a beinghuman that, in absolute certainty of g-d, stops perceiving his possibilities and decisions and becomes utter force, the generation and exhaustion of his force that is the manifestation of g-d's force in him: beowulf becomes the ontological cessation of beinghuman before the imminent revelation of g-d (to know oneself is progressively unnecessary for beinghuman doesn't reveal himself, it is g-d that reveals g-d to himself, and beinghuman's task is only to wait for the end and to think and act according to this waiting): g-d is the supreme force in which beings, Being and World will consume in the year 1000 (for 'to the lord a day is like a thousand years, and a thousand years are like a day'): this absolutely anonymous year is expected not as denial of the ontological identification of beinghuman as such but as the divine confirmation of the reality of g-d-that-is-beinghuman, for before the year 1000 christ identified as g-d is never presented dead: the crucified christ is always alive, calm and with his eyes open, for that is how beinghumans will see and be seen by him

3,2,2,3 the year 1000 arrives: this is the year of pure light, it is the dissolution of the individual, the general, and the total in the undeniable force-that-is-g-d, it is the climactic manifestation of a period in which trials by ordeal are understood as divine destiny or ruin appointed by g-d's will towards the innocent and the guilty so as to manifest himself above all of them: this year is the middle point of the entire ontological course from preontology to postontology: this year stands as the mirror from which the entire ontological course up to this point is from then on started to be seen backwards: postontology has more in common with preontology and the year 1000 than with any other point of the ontological course: yet the second coming did not occur, and this climactic year passed unperceived: events are almost unregistered, nothing important happened except that in 1005, according to chronicler william of malbury, elimer (born 981, died 1061), another monk from the abbey, attached wings to his arms and legs to form a glider and launched himself from a tower, flying some 200 meters before crashing, perhaps because his glider was not stabilized by a tail, and is said to have broken both his legs: music had already introduced polyphony a century back (perhaps the melisma added to the last or second-to-last syllable of an

alleluia manifested the end as disorienting chaos approaching), the consequences of the failed apocalypse didn't appear until the next century: stained glass and illuminated manuscripts were done as always, pure light is but primary colors: beinghuman's representations are bold and childish, emptied of all force (for all force was given to g-d): masterpieces were achieved at their simplest form: no decisive turning point was apparent: there is no tragedy or comedy, no rupture of notions, no excessive movement: expectancy, having reached its highest point, is paralyzed: yet the years follow and it has all been a foolish misunderstanding, nothing to get anxious or upset about: it is as if, faced against the possible consummation of everything, beinghuman wanted to continue living, untroubled, and to his surprise: the failure of a mystery (perhaps because it was not mysterious enough) glimpses an even higher mystery behind it

3,2,2,4 after this year christ is presented as dead for the first time in an artwork (the dead christ-g-d pervades between 1000 and 1500, distinct from the agonizing christ-beinghuman abandoned by g-d that is manifested after the year 1500): there is yet another theological ontological division of paths, one towards keeping g-d-as-a-force from which all originates and ends, the other path reinterpreting g-d as what he once was, a beinghuman connected from body to soul through the emergence of force from and between these two opposites (this is manifest in the clause which broke apart these two theological paths, 'spirit is brought forth from the father and from the son'): the crusades are begun to regain the city of g-d only after g-d failed to reveal himself: even though the individual had been emerging from society until both again constituted a single entity (as is expressed in *everyman*, the most anonymous of all theological masterpieces), the individuals again start to appear and proclaim themselves as beinghumans and to take joy and pain because of their possibilities and decisions, such as abelard, dante, giotto and saint joan of arc: music undertakes polyphony for the first time by breaking the monophonic gregorian chants into, for example, three connected melodies so as to keep manifesting g-d in the form of the holy trinity (that is, god-that-is-beinghuman), but troubadours also break the never ending eternity of gregorian chants in which beinghuman was immersed by composing songs whose conceivable-to-the-attention length starts to determine a distinct beginning and end to it: music as all other arts (for the theological unification of presentation|examination slowly starts to disintegrate) explore themes that refer to beinghuman's identification of himself gradually distinguished from other beinghumans and g-d by means of his possibilities and decisions amid the beginning and end of his own life: theological science (as the reaction towards World that is determined by its ontological period) seeks g-d-that-is-force through alchemy or other scientific methods that gradually start to manifest beinghuman's pursuit and identification with that pursuit more than what is being pursued: opposite notions are again fixed to beinghuman: the persecution of heretics, witch hunts and the elongated figures of art constitute the antiontological second half of the theological period, that is, the contrary notions that also manifest theological beinghuman: yet this antiontological posture determines a new, very subtle difference concerning the entire ontological course up to the year 1000: beinghuman, however difficult it is for him to start revealing himself again, is slowly but surely incapable of reentering society and g-d: as opposed to the past, beinghuman is not emerging from society and g-d as an individual, thereby reaffirming the essential role that society and g-d play in his life: society and g-d are receding back from beinghuman, who can only begin to create his own individual world and try to insert in it as best he can society and g-d, as proved by the worlds of dante, *piers plowman* and the ars nova music of the period: whereas saint augustine examines himself so as to reveal the force of g-d within him and within all beinghumans perceived as a society identified as one, dante

presents himself separate from g-d and society, that is, perfectly immerse in them yet gradually and decisively distinct from them: it is not g-d's force that is impelling him towards beatrice as this force once repelled saint augustine away from women: his surrendering to the absolute manifestation of g-d at the end of *the divine comedy* is equal and simultaneous to the absolute annulation of his own being that, rather than dissolve towards other beings, manifest the ontological failure of the individual himself (as opposed to saint augustine, whose surrendering to g-d manifests g-d as much as it manifests himself as subject to g-d): even though surrendering is the climactic essence of ontological theology, saint augustine aspires to this surrendering and is capable of abandoning everything to achieve it, while dante, as soon as beatrice abandons him in the last celestial sphere, feels he has no choice left but to surrender himself to g-d: dante never establishes for himself a specific seat in the very structured scheme of the afterlife, he successfully excludes himself from society, yet his own personal world would be incomplete without society and g-d so he does not decide either to return back to them or to establish his own place amid them: he lets them into his own world: the only way to maintain orientation in this individual world is by placing himself between the hands of g-d and society, in between these two pulling forces, though he himself is in between them and can only be himself: rather than incorporating himself to them, his final consummation in the absolute revelation of g-d above all other identifications leaves the individual beinghuman more alone than ever before as to his own impotent, unachievable identification which the theological period is now trying harder and harder to manifest

3,2,2,5 since the introduction of good deeds that everyman aspires to, passing through saint thomas aquinas (who understood the failure of the year 1000 not as the failure of g-d's fury but as the victory of g-d's patience), as well as dante's afterlife in which all beinghumans are placed in their spot according to their actions, and as in piers plowman's pursuit of dowe, dobet and dobest, the late theological period eventually reaches the emphasis on will-directed-towards-action as its central point of ontological disclosure (as is expressed by longe wille, the possible author of *piers plowman* but, more importantly, the notion of will that takes a long time to fulfill, as is also expressed by the polyphonic emergence by means of the organum that would later manifest to its utmost perfection, in *ars subtilior*, will-directed-towards-action): the apocalypse is again expected (not in respect to g-d's thought or will but to g-d's action) for the year 1500 for it is a number dividable into three, thereby expressing better than 1000 not the unity of g-d-that-is-force but the holy trinity, that is, g-d that is the supreme and ideal force by which beinghuman can reveal, though once again the revelation of g-d does not occur: this is justified as the appearance of a new pagan continent which stands as a totally distinct course from ontology and nonontology, or the apocalypse did not happen due to the inexactitude of the calendar which decisively confirms the scientific boom of the next period (called 'scientific' not because of the supremacy of the examination of World over being, but because humanbeing is no longer bound towards the emergence of being but towards the re-installment of World): in any case, the disillusionment that the third and last failed apocalypse caused demanded a new ontological period whose direction (be it in art, philosophy, theology or science) should head towards humanbeing

3,3 the scientific period: let sea-discoverers to new world have gone,
let maps to other, worlds on worlds have showne,
let us possesse one world; each hath one, and is one

3,3,0,0,1 humanbeing, though inseparably related to g-d and society, is decisively distinguished from them: each divide into their own world in Word: in order to maintain World and the worlds within it, humanbeing has to achieve the ontological revelation that can only irrupt from humanbeing who recognizes himself as humanbeing and nothing else, as is shown in durer's self-portrait and all self-portraits that emerge from this point onwards: g-d perseveres as g-d and society perseveres as society inasmuch as humanbeing is only concerned for his own ontological exploration: and yet that is the most distinctive phenomenon that the failure of the year 1000 produced: humanbeing's quest to acknowledge himself not only in his own realization but as the maker of such a realization understood as the making itself: aristophanes' and plato's mention of themselves in their own work constitutes the emergence of individuality from society, yet the ontological concern is not directed towards themselves but towards society itself and how society acknowledges the presence of individuals within it and towards the individuals themselves conceiving of themselves in a society: protagoras' 'man is the measure of all things' is philosophically denied for it individualizes humanbeing beyond the reach of society: the road up and the road down are established as one and the same road both by the man that walks that road as by the objective perspective which only the common of men can take concerning the road: both the individual's perspective as society's perspective coincide: all doubts concerning a specific ontological notion are always solved, in the philosophical period, by comparing how that notions functions in a society: aristophanes and plato introduce in their work each and every one of the characters and notions that define a society and that are defined by this very same society, yet aristophanes and plato never take a moment aside to describe themselves for there is nothing beyond the social|individual connection of the philosophical period: society is as much perceived by the individual plato and aristophanes as the individual plato and aristophanes themselves are only perceived through the eyes of society and not their own: not only is there nothing beyond that connection, but aristophanes and plato aren't even the exclusive makers of their own work, for humanbeing manifests through each and every one of his realizations this correspondence between society and the individual by way of themes, stories and concepts that are originated and manifested as socially created themselves in the figure of myths or philosophical meditations that should then be reinterpreted through the vision of each particular artist or philosopher, yet this actualization is not the merit of the maker-of-life but of the ontological quest that was laid down by society from its very beginning (this very same position is held in transitional preontological theology): the presenter|examinator of the philosophical period, inasmuch as he snatches the realization from tradition (that is, society) gives his realization back to society again: plato's distinction of 'truth' from 'convention' arrives to a definition of 'truth' that both society and then the individual should necessarily arrive at together, for it is society that first laid the foundations for 'truth' so that later the individual might discover 'truth' and return it back to society (humanbeing, according to plato, has to go back to the bottom of the cave to rescue society): in the scientific period, on the contrary, universal men do not establish the measures for man: as goethe understood it, universal man establishes the measure for all men: humanbeing reaches out to society but must always return to himself: for society proved wrong when condemning socrates to death, and g-d proved wrong when killing christ for nothing, failing to reveal himself at the appointed time: the ontological course can only advance by concentrating on what, at that point, had still not failed: the individual as such: and the individual as such, free of the themes, subjects and concepts imposed by society and g-d, has only himself to look at: his realization becomes the world of humanbeing (a world in which all humanbeings coincide inasmuch as all have the same world within themselves)

3,3,0,0,2 this first stage of the scientific period is a transitional stage, for it concludes the theological period and begins the scientific period: this stage constitutes the achievement of absolute action (as is expressed in machiavelli, for example): palestrina's music is not debating itself between two opposite notions, it is not in the expectancy of something to happen: palestrina's music is happening, it is within a specific side of the spectrum and does not imply there is another side to it yet it does not fail to reach this side of the spectrum either nor is it expecting to grasp it still further: it is again, as in the philosophical period, the complete distinction of harmony and chaos yet it is also a complete choice for either one or the other, and palestrina's music is absolute nonthoughtful nonwilling action (as leonardo's and raphael's paintings), yet this harmony causes so much wonder that one is bound to try to understand it, and one can only understand it through opposite notions, and so thought is slowly reintroduced: by itself, action produces thought in those who look upon that action immediately after

3,3,0,0,3 the reemergence of opposite notions exclusively concerned for humanbeing as such is manifest in the light|darkness polarization of late leonardo and michelangelo up to el greco and caravaggio, just as music strives into strangeness again yet not in quest for overlapping vibrations which radiate force but in the quest for a defined major and minor musical scale with which to manifest these perfect contraries and the force between them that describe|define humanbeing recognized as himself: but this reemergence of opposite notions, perfectly balanced by the opposition one decision establishes concerning another, is gradually felt to tilt, as opposite notions as a whole, towards an unprecedented exploration of darkness over light, as in shakespeare's sonnet 127, as well as concerning the possibility of nothing (as is conceived by the mathematical emergence of the zero): the ontological course constitutes no longer a rise towards absolute understanding and permanence but, since the year 1000, a gradual fall, even though each ontological period (philosophical|scientific as well as every theological period) is constituted by its own particular rise and fall: the entrance into darkness constitutes the destiny of humanbeing and his ontological course in its entirety heading towards the ineludible ruin of this very same course

3,3,0,0,1 shakespeare's definition of the following four centuries: to be or not to be

3,3,0,0,1,1 shakespeare, through the realization of the *sonnets* as a self-portrait, has achieved the absolute identification with himself as an individual, perfectly distinct from society and g-d: the following four centuries emerged from the tragedies, the tragedies originated from the *sonnets*, therefore this poetic acknowledgment of oneself is the fundamental source of the scientific period

3,3,0,0,1,2 how does one define the individual as such?: by detaching humanbeing from society and g-d, shakespeare has also achieved a new distinction which will open up the road for the scientific period: the realm of the body is no longer connected to the realm of soul through the bridge of the mind as in the philosophical and theological periods: by excluding society (the body) and g-d (the soul) from the individual (the mind), shakespeare has established the bridge philosophically understood as the mind as its own realm, just as humanbeing is also constituted for the first time in his own realm: humanbeing is now constituted by three realms inseparably connected one to the other, though also perfectly distinct: the body, the mind and the soul: yet the ontological revelation of humanbeing does not spring forth from the body or the soul: the

standpoint of humanbeing, according to shakespeare, is positioned in the mind: the scientific course, starting from shakespeare, progressively aspires to postulate that the mind is not subject to body and the soul, nor is it the force that connects them, nor does the revelation of the mind depend on the baser and higher revelation of body and soul: body and soul are revealed through the mind, they are revealed in the mind so as to reveal the mind itself, mind is the realm to which body and soul, as forces and not as realms, seek to arrive to: the mind is expressed in shakespeare in the form of the soliloquy: humanbeing conversing with himself alone in the stage: the awe the chorus inspires in philosophical dramas equals the awe the individual inspires in the scientific dramas: from this fundamental breakthrough of shakespeare can humanbeing generate new ontological aspirations concerning himself, this time as an individual: if philosophical humanbeing is defined by society, if theological beinghuman is defined by g-d, scientific humanbeing is defined by himself: the gradual quest for objectivity and reality from the preontological age to the year 1000, is after that year (as expressed in dante's and *piers plowman's* dreams) directed towards the quest to subjectivity and illusion

3,3,0,0,1,3 shakespeare, through the realization of the *sonnets*, has also distinguished the categories in which the individual as mind is divided: thought, will and action: shakespeare's tragedies constitute the exploration of each one of these notions

3,3,0,0,1,4 the middle point between the fall of reality and the rise of illusion is conveyed by the question to be or not to be?: this is the essential question that defines the entire ontological age, but whereas this question seeks to define and to be defined by the framework of reality pursued in the philosophical period and half of the theological period, hamlet redirects this question (expressed through his concern for appearance, the theme from which parmenides departed towards the achievement of truth) by seeking to define and to be defined by the ever approaching revelation of illusion pursued from the year 1000 onwards: if madness in the philosophical period is defined by humanbeing disconnected from society, if madness in the theological period is understood as a diabolical possession that impedes the acknowledgment of g-d, madness in the scientific period (starting from hamlet and don quixote) is both an individual disconnected from himself as it is the progressive achievement of pure illusion

3,3,0,0,1,5 this question is expressed by the exploration of light and darkness in the tragedies: hamlet dresses himself in black; othello is black; king leir's world is neither light nor dark, it is gray; macbeth's world is entirely black

3,3,0,1 hamlet is defined by thought: thought is manifested through the soliloquies (exactly in the manner in which shakespeare speaks to himself in the *sonnets*)

3,3,0,2 in *othello* it is iago who manifests humanbeing defined by will: othello only satisfies the philosophical dramatic canons in which a force exterior to humanbeing (be it destiny or ruin) takes him down: othello identifies himself with society and g-d, he does not identify exclusively with himself as iago does: iago is the protagonist of *othello*: for iago, thought is only worth something inasmuch as it is set forward towards an end: this process is will

3,3,0,3 in *king lear* will no longer emerges from thought but is thoroughly directed towards action: yet king lear is defined by a will that never reaches its appointed end: action is never

fulfilled: humanbeing only wills to will, only desires to desire: if by defining humanbeing as an 'i' the ontological identification of an individual slowly starts to disintegrate (for the 'i' can only constitute self-denial, that is, conscience is the step back, never forward, until conscience steps back from conscience and becomes unconscious), king lear's understanding of himself as a 'we', totally unacceptable in characters such as claudius or othello yet justified as the connection between society and g-d which they, as individuals, supposedly represent, is even more unacceptable in king lear for he renounced this representation in favor of his daughters: he speaks of 'we' without knowing he is an individual humanbeing: madness in king lear is caused not by his individuality, as in hamlet, but by the plurality of his individuality, that is, by the gradual emergence of many individualities within him

3,3,0,4 macbeth is defined by his actions: lady macbeth urges him to neither care for thoughts nor consider will of any importance unless an action is done: he no longer confronts his individuality nor seeks to choose one of the infinite individual identities by which he is composed: action finishes ontological identification

3,3,1 hamlet's definition of thought is first examined by descartes: i think therefore i am: yet humanbeing as world-in-being cannot be completely separated from society and g-d for thought is not the medium by which society and g-d are connected but the point of union which holds society and g-d together in the individual (though the individual always holds himself and can only hold himself as an individual, distinct from society and g-d, for society and g-d are identified by themselves as themselves, and cannot be infiltrated, nor are they complimentary nor comparable to the individual identification but are subject to it: they reflect the individual identification only inasmuch as the individual identifies himself as himself): descartes' definition of humanbeing in accordance to his thought sets out to prove, immediately afterwards, the existence of both society and g-d (linked yet distinct concerning the individual) understood as the structure in which all individualities acknowledge themselves as such: *las meninas*, by velazquez, is also a supreme manifestation of thought (in the limit of reality and illusion), which implies the forthcoming problem of subjectivity: the question is how can one identify himself as himself from within if humanbeing cannot identify no other being aside from himself, or how another identification can affect one's own identification, that is, under what parameters can one compare one's own identification from another, how is one's own identification remotely possible even for oneself?: the manifestation of the individual humanbeing in all individuals is only possible through the establishment of not only thought but the criteria by which all thought is possible: reason, understood as criteria-based-thought to its highest degree, is examined by kant's *critique of pure reason*: one notion, however powerful it may be, always implies its opposite notion, and opposite notions are precisely opposite by the fact that there is a force that connects them as such: if poetry is the postulation of a unique notion (that implies its opposite notion and the force between them), and if drama is the postulation of opposite notions (that imply the force between them), epic is the postulation of opposite notions and the intermediate force that connects both notions so as to manifest them as completely distinct yet inseparably related: kant is the epic manifestation of thought: the same epic force of kant was manifested before in bach's music, which expresses static intensity (as pure reason is also static intensity) by masterfully using counterpoint (which is rational in the degree that it completely detaches itself from being-in-force harmonies by revealing force-in-being harmonies, that is, humanbeing's emotions, distinct individual melodies and the force of time that, though always returning to its

origin, achieves this concentric manifestation of thought by a lineal development acquiring more and more force as it moves forward) based on the perfectly distinguished major and minor scales (that is, by revealing opposite notions that, either in the same piece or by the comparison between them, never seem to conquer one over the other, and this eventually causes notions to break as in *the art of fugue*): antiontological reason (reason that, with its own tools, ends by choosing darkness over light) is expressed, for instance, in moliere, jonathan swift or the marquis de sade: as in the philosophical and theological periods, all realizations of this scientific stage view thought not as the only element by which humanbeing is defined but as the standpoint in which will and action rest upon: this is newton's standpoint also, who defined time and space as objective, rational frameworks: yet the frameworks of time and space no longer supposes that the celestial spheres are perfect, eternal circles moving through perfect, eternal orbits, as reflection of eternal World manifested by aristotle's philosophical science and the theological period's science: newton defines World by a new figure: the line, which begins in one point and ends in another due to the force that impulses it: this line by which World is defined can only be conceived as humanbeing's identification also lineally advancing through his own line, as well as humanbeing advancing through the line established by the ontological course itself: even though this line is also supposed to be perfect and eternal, the increasing revelation of a force superior to each individual line's force leaves no alternative to lines but to generate and exhaust themselves manifesting its climactic point in its middle: that is, newton's time and space, as forces not pertaining to eternity, generate and exhaust their own framework: kant, following newton, establishes time as the objective perspective from which the comparison and achievement of all ontological identifications is possible, for all identifications occur in time, and time can only be perceived by thought (for thought, according to him, is outside of time): therefore thought defines humanbeing as such: yet kant, as opposed to the philosophical period, is not trying to fix the real, objective ideals reason should aspire to (as he later tries to do as a practical endeavor with no success whatsoever), but only establishing the criteria by which reason can be understood and undertaken: these criteria end up falling, by the impulse towards illusion itself, to subjectivity: whereas the objective perspective, for the philosophical period, depends on all humanbeings who establish all notions as such, kant's determination of the objective framework no longer returns time back to being but pushes this framework towards nothing, for time (as the essential perspective from which the individual is defined) is inhabited by no one: the acknowledgment of other remote, completely different courses parallel to the ontological one leaves humanbeing ever more alone within his own course: not only is the identification of the individual as himself at risk, but the entire course that conveyed the pursuit of identification is also at risk: kant comes to this conclusion when, in the last chapter of the *critique of pure reason* he states: 'i shall not here attempt to distinguish the periods of history in which this or that change in metaphysics came about'

3,3,2 hegel thinks that not only the identification of humanbeing is subject to time (including thought itself, for there is a process by which thought arrives to its conclusions), but the entire ontological course is also subject to time heading towards its climactic manifestation: hegel views thought as moving forwards within a process: thought is set to motion: hegel defines humanbeing by thought advancing as will: this is also the case in beethoven's music: yet iago's will is further manifested by schopenhauer, who believes there is no rational decisiveness from which to part from: there is only blind will moving forwards: as schopenhauer, kierkegaard distrusts time as an objective perspective for all: the thought of each humanbeing is totally

immerse in time, and therefore time is a subjective experience that all humanbeings, when identified as individuals, share in common: the individual is not determined by the ontological course in which he is in, but rather the ontological course is itself a subjective experience and perceives itself as an individual perceives himself, that is, from its own generation towards its exhaustion: only then is the ontological course continued as humanbeing's individual course through time, only then can humanbeing and his ontological course keep identifying one in the other: yet as in the work of keats, schubert, schumann, chopin or friedrich, the direction of the ontological course has become unclear: will becomes despair: the laws of reason imply their own exceptions: will advancing powerfully through time is incapable of systematizing: how much does the notion of completion correspond to nature's evolutionary accident by which humanbeing ended up with ten fingers?: opposite notions are not symmetrical as humanbeings are not entirely symmetrical themselves: the scientific examination of 'evolution', gradually lacking origin and end, can only be brought forth during the will stage of the scientific period: identification itself and anything it identifies as such becomes an ever more artificial endeavor, an invention, an illusion: notions stop implying their opposite, notions break one from the other, opposite notions are most powerfully manifest when finally detached from the opposition (as in the philosophical period, tragedy is entirely detached from comedy): poe takes rational thought to be the cause of pure evil; hawthorne conceives the impulse of will to originate and end towards evil: this ambiguous, detaching state was started by hegel himself when he fractured the ontological premises of aristotle in which all beings are defined as that being which they are in relationship to World: the establishment of particular beings with which aristotle aspired to manifest the force of World as the exact reflection of humanbeing connected to the world of humanbeings becomes, in hegel, the opposite revelation, by which a being can be conceived as many beings, that is, inside every being there is a world: detaching opposites lose their force as immovable static notions when perceived by individualizing will advancing (carrying all notions with it) through time: by comparing the ontological course to other distinct courses occurring simultaneously (the nonontological one, the preontological one, or the postontological one revealed a long time before in other remote places), hegel, melville, or gaugin acknowledge the ontological course not only as entirely subjective but as exhausting itself: it is gradually humanbeing himself who seeks to exhaust this ontological course, whether furiously or patiently: light and darkness no longer occur in van gogh's or cezanne's painting; major and minor scales are being broken by wagner and debussy; free verse is disacknowledging time and space as a framework by which a beginning lineally reaches a conclusive end: as the space that pushes opposite notions grow farther and farther apart, the time with which will moves forward grows shorter and shorter, as expressed by painting or the emergence of photography: the emphasis on individuality gradually conveys the rupture of the individual from society and g-d, as is expressed in the works of thoreau, verdi, bizet, wagner and dostoyevsky: humanbeing, using the same force with which society and g-d are collapsing underneath him, may still be able to identify himself as himself, for the individual identification is ever more possible and decidable when the external obstructions are removed, yet society and g-d have still not entirely collapsed for they can be rescued as part of the individual, as expressed in whitman when he recognizes both the divine and the multitudes of individuals he contains within): will still moves forward towards what may be a definite acknowledgment concerning humanbeing's pursuance of himself: yet there is an imminent danger ahead, described by tolstoy when levin suddenly finds himself, for a moment, wanting to 'will to will'

3,3,3 nietzsche states that society and g-d refer to nothing: the reinsertion of individual humanbeing into society and g-d from 1000 onwards could only be achieved by understanding society as the accumulation of individuals who pursue to identify themselves as humanbeings, identification that can only be established by the distinction of opposite notions which hold confronted|linked to each other through force-that-is-g-d as the ruling point from which the pursuance of permanence can still be conveyed: society persists up to nietzsche for as long as an individual will implies an end to it, all humanbeings that define themselves through individual will are heading towards the same end concerning their humanbeing; g-d also persists up to nietzsche for individual will implies a termination point, this termination point can only occur as long as either one notion or its opposite is decisively chosen upon, this decision can only be decisive inasmuch as it corresponds to humanbeing's identification of himself, identification can only be understood as a permanent state of something that is, and g-d is the only notion by which a permanent state is still conceivable: nietzsche, trying to establish the individual's identification to its last consequences (scientific philosophy is the aspiration to last consequences, as opposed to philosophic philosophy which is the aspiration to first causes), establishes all notions and purposes as exclusive for each individual, thereby completely cancelling society and g-d, for society is accumulation of individuals and g-d is only a name for force which could only be conceived if it emerged from the individual's identification itself: yet the supreme identification of oneself as oneself implies the annulment of opposite notions substituted by the emergence of absolute force within oneself: if this force is not transferable, that is, if it only occurs between each humanbeings' life and death as a manifestation of himself, nietzsche realizes permanence, therefore identification, therefore a termination point (since humanbeing cannot compare what goes before and after his own termination point), are all impossible: humanbeing cannot be identified without opposite notions, humanbeing cannot be identified without a termination point: for nietzsche, will directs nowhere: there are no values (for there is no ground for comparison) except the value of constituting an individual: not only is the individual's impossibility of identification manifest in nietzsche, but the entire ontological course since the preontological age seems to him an epic manifestation and march towards this impossibility finally revealed: after the ontological identification of humanbeing as himself there is no other ontological identification, therefore the exhaustion of the ontological course becomes its destruction and denial in nietzsche's philosophy: why then does nietzsche always speak of himself as 'we' when he refers not to his contemporary humanbeings held together between society and g-d (for there can only be individual identifications), and not to the past and future humanbeings connected through an ontological course (for nietzsche has nothing in common with humanbeings who failed to see their own impossible identification, thereby entirely detaching himself from this course)?: the 'we' nietzsche employs is the 'we' king lear employs: both end up mad: he uses the 'we' of madness because he needs this ontological course to demonstrate its entire failure, he cannot detach himself from this course, because his purpose is the climactic identification of individuals which, even though individual in themselves, must somehow identify as such: contradiction is the basis of nietzsche's work by which thought is decisively exhausted: the only way to surpass contradiction is to acknowledge that the identification of oneself, inasmuch as it cannot extend beyond its own identification, leads to the manifestation of absolute force within it, to such an extent that, when identification is disclosed as entirely impossible, force is revealed as the basic impulse of World of illusion before, through and beyond any identification: the contradiction of his philosophy rests between the ontological pursuance of will that seeks to perpetuate itself as will in order for humanbeing to identify as an

individual, simultaneous to the will heading nowhere and becoming force beyond all identification: this contradiction extends to the entire stage: if nietzsche decisively concludes thought-directed-towards-will, he also inaugurates will-directed-towards-action: the absolute individual's identification of himself is continued by way of a new rupture: the absolute discarding of body and soul, leaving humanbeings' identification to the realm of the mind only: even though this rupture characterizes the whole of the scientific period, for the first time mind lacks an objective perspective for it no longer corresponds to society or g-d: inasmuch as identification is impossible, humanbeing's desires concerning this identification will always be unfulfilled: unfulfillment as will-towards-unachievable-action is expressed not by the completely extreme and detached opposite notions of the thought-towards-will's stage but by ever more ambiguous, atonal modes prophesized by *king lear's* grayness, which is both a lack of light|darkness opposites (the gradual culmination of the pursuance of ontological identification) as it is the emergence of absolute color (the gradual emergence of postontological force that is not subject to any identification): the relativity of mind towards the delirious, disoriented instant is revealed by the collapse of opposite notions, the collapse of objective timespace, the collapse of linearity that manifested beginnings connected to endings (the new scientific figure reigning is the arbitrary, delirious, instantaneous curve): the constant citation and reference to different points of the ontological course and to the different failed courses treaded by humanbeing slowly manifest the absolute artificiality and illusion of all courses and humanbeing within those courses: in a movie theater, cinema reveals itself as sitting in the end of plato's illusionary cave

3,3,4 the transitional postontological period: nothing is but what is not

4 this is the last stage of shakespeare's standpoints concerning humanbeing: action, as expressed by macbeth: yet it is also a transitional period which as much concludes the ontological age (and all its identifications) in its entirety as it inaugurates the postontological age, just as the cosmology period is also a transitional period among the preontological age and the ontological age: sartre defines world-in-being exclusively by his actions: transitional postontological period's art, philosophy and science are defined by action: will has ended and is now substituted by chance, that is, the final disacknowledgement of possibilities and decisions: world-in-being is utterly alone, distinct from others and from himself: action is emptiness: action only manifests the force within it: world-in-being's identification through opposite notions, as well as lineal time and oriented space, is annulled: no conclusive beginning and endings: the irradiant elements (such as macbeth's hand in fluorescent blood) acquire their brilliance by being submerged in a black World: the illusion of World no longer manifests the mind: preontology first separated each body from the all-pervading soul of World (a soul that infused rocks, trees, animals and stars with no distinction between them); the philosophical period, establishing being and world to himself, only managed to connect both realms as himself by implanting the force of mind between them; the theological period, dismissing beinghuman's identification, aspires to force-that-is-g-d, yet g-d, as source, manifestation and judge of body and soul of all beings, gradually acquires the force of mind (through the wisdom books) in order to connect g-d's body and soul into a perfect beinghuman as finally manifested by christ; shakespeare and descartes, perceiving body and soul to be exhausted, inaugurated mind as its own realm, body and soul gradually losing their own realms in order to become the opposite forces that unite in the realm of mind; the transitional postontological period, having achieved the absolute manifestation of mind, can no longer express mind as a realm but can only reintroduce, as its climactic manifestation of

itself, bodies and souls: the perceptions of mind are absolutely unreal only when, happening at the depth of mind, they become bodies and souls that do not manifest themselves as such but the fantastic force that irrupts from, across, beyond and outside of them: mind no longer subsists in the postontological age for any realization that explains and refers what it perceives to the realm of the mind loses all its might and power: to lose mind is to exchange world for World: postontology is spontaneous generation: all is directed towards the instant, both discontinuous and unpredictable: fragmented instants compile themselves as much as they abruptly interrupt themselves, twist each other's course and precipitate new instants: world-in-being is no longer world in being, but World in being: this World, as immense as the preontological World, is not real: it is complete and absolute illusion: yet in order to edify this postontological World, all realizations must be inserted into it: inasmuch as World-in-being lives in oneiric, instantaneous World, World-in-being no longer confronts|links his making-of-life to life: warhol's antiontological paintings, rather than banally closing the mystical tunnel that connects life to the-making-of-life (forcing one to see wood in the sculpture of a lion when the first preontological being-in-World first saw a lion instead of wood) achieved an even higher miracle: World-in-being now sees art wherever he turns to, not nature: World-in-being projects the making-of-life everywhere, he lives in his own realization which can only be expressed by the realization within the realization (as all the scientific period undertakes, starting from the inversion of being-in-world towards world-in-being starting from the year 1000): realization extends to both life and to the making-of-life as an all-abiding making-of-life itself: the ontological course advancing through all three ages, inasmuch as it conceives of itself in its entirety, becomes the realization itself in which all realizations are in: this force is manifestation of World of illusion as expression of all-abiding realization: theological harmonies are again reintroduced as expression of extemporal force (for illusionary sound does not reflect the breath needed to execute it, but rather immerses World-in-being in breath), yet at the same time postontological force turns against and breaks these harmonies at each instant: repetition manifested by all arts, however much it is similar to the original, does not feel the same the second time: it is hypnotic as it is nauseous (the force that, when taken from being, is returned to force itself): repetition detaches World-in-being from time and space: reproduction is no longer the preservation of the original, the original is the manifestation and pursuance of reproduction itself: the length of the instant can be abbreviated or infinitely prolonged, yet World-in-being is inside that instant that cannot be generated or exhausted: repetition leaves World-in-being nowhere, that is, in no specific point of either the ontological course or one's own course or nowhere: force is detached from the identification which it used to represent: whereas force is ontologically the force that identifies being as being, the illusion of beings (the beingness of nothing) not only manifests force superior to beings, but for the first time has to destroy beings and destroy destruction to manifest force: World-in-being no longer apprehends and manifests the force within him but is snatched and destroyed by the force trampling him, just as any other being is also snatched and destroyed by force: postontological appearance is force and it is idea, reality and things and beings never reached their own idea: postontology is always a mistake, always incomplete, always a lie, always force that destroys: if identification is impossible and unrealizable, force does not therefore cease: force acquires more and more unlimited, uncontainable, electrical, self-destructive force: the force with which force fights resistance is no longer its opposite notion but force increasingly accumulated: force abruptly reveals itself with the same compulsion with which it empties itself: force is nothing: nothing is before, across, beyond and outside one and all: force that no longer distinguishes the limit between one being and another, uninterrupted

force, force that is different at every instant and in between one instant and another (thereby accumulating more and more force), force that arbitrarily irrupts in World-in-being, across World-in-being, and across force itself: force emerges from nothing, manifests nothing and returns to nothing without ever implying anything more or less than nothing: the force of nothing is the force of dying that does not end: not climatic manifestation, but climactic annihilation: only by accepting nothing can illusion irrupt: pure image and sound appear when nothing trembles: postontological World persists not a moment further after being, just as preontological being persists not a moment further after World: being is that which is always unfulfilling, World is that which is always unfulfilled: if preontology apprehends World as force that does not necessarily or exclusively pierce being-in-World (if it even pierces being-in-World at all), if ontology manifests force that necessarily pierces humanbeing, if the philosophical period deduces humanbeing from being|World, if theology manifests World as beinghuman, if the scientific period deduces humanbeing from World|being, postontology projects World by destroying World-in-being: force is self-contained light: light is the breath of darkness, not its opposite: the postontological age manifests the following play after *macbeth: the tempest*: postontology is the most exalted and profound ontology, since it is the force of the delirious instant: the dream World is the manifestation of absolute individual who, as much as he lives all that a World-in-being can live in a dream, lives nothing (for he who eats in dreams dies of starvation): World-in-being who as much as he pursues the deepest, wildest encounter with himself, the most climactic identification possible, no matter how much force the encounter may carry, is then demolished by the instant of the next brutal encounter, completely cancelling the previous instant and oblivious of forthcoming instants, the force with which all illusions convert World-in-being into the force of his own illusion: the mystery is that there is no mystery

5 postontology